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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
 Herman Friedman (―Friedman‖) was convicted of 
bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) and sentenced 
to 34 months of imprisonment.  Friedman argues on appeal 
that (1) the District Court abused its discretion in rejecting 
Friedman‘s proposed jury instruction; (2) the District Court 
erred in excluding witness testimony; (3) the District Court 
improperly limited Friedman‘s cross-examination of certain 
witnesses; (4) the District Court erred in denying Friedman‘s 
motion for mistrial based on violations of Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); and (5) Friedman‘s sentence is 
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procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  Friedman 
appeals the final judgment of conviction and sentence 
imposed by the District Court on April 26, 2010.  For the 
reasons discussed below, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction and remand to the District Court for resentencing.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 Friedman was part owner of an apartment building at 
235 56th Street West New York (―WNY‖), New Jersey.  On 
March 2, 2007, Building Inspector Silvio Acosta (―Acosta‖) 
conducted a routine inspection of the apartment building that 
Friedman owned and concluded that, in addition to the 
building‘s fifteen legal units, it contained a sixteenth illegal 
unit.  On March 27, 2007, Acosta issued a Notice of Violation 
instructing Friedman to remove the illegal apartment unit.  
Friedman did not comply and Acosta issued a Municipal 
Court complaint on May 25, 2007, claiming that Friedman 
was in violation of § 106.1 of the International Property 
Maintenance Code.   
 On or around July 5, 2007, Friedman met with 
Construction Code Official, Franco Zanardelli (―Zanardelli‖).  
At the time of the meeting, Zanardelli had been cooperating 
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (―FBI‖), as a result 
of his June 25, 2007 arrest for bribes he had previously 
accepted.  Zanardelli confirmed that the computerized tax 
records showed only fifteen legal units in the building and 
informed Friedman that he needed to either seek a variance 
from the Board of Adjustment or remove the illegal 
apartment.  Friedman followed Zanardelli‘s admonition and 
filled out an ―Application for Variance/Denial Letter,‖ the 
first step in the variance application process.  (App. at 1515.)  
In essence, Friedman claimed that the building contained 
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sixteen rental units when he bought it in 2006 and that there 
was no indication that the unit was a recent addition. 
On July 11, 2007, Friedman appeared in the Municipal 
Court in response to the complaint.  The Municipal Court 
advised Friedman to work with the town‘s Building Office to 
devise a resolution out of court because the violation could 
accrue a daily penalty of up to $500.     
Friedman called Zanardelli on July 12, 2007, urging 
him to grant a Certificate of Occupancy (―C.O.‖), without 
going through the process of the variance.  Zanardelli said 
that ―maybe‖ there was a way to do so and said, ―let me look 
at all the records I have in there.  What, what do you want to 
do?  You just want to legalize the unit?‖ and Friedman 
responded, ―Yes I want to legalize it and take out permits, and 
just redo it, to make, to make a new unit out of it.‖  (App. at 
979-80.)  Zanardelli said, ―Oh.  I don‘t care.  Without going 
through the, without going through the-‖; Friedman 
interjected and said ―Without going through the whole nine 
yards.‖  (Id. at 980.)  Zanardelli replied, ―Without going 
through the nine yards.  Uh-huh.  Alright, let me see what I 
can do.‖  (Id.)   
The parties disagree as to which documents Zanardelli 
reviewed.  According to Zanardelli‘s testimony, he requested 
all tax documents associated with the tax property and 
reviewed the paper tax file for WNY to confirm the 
computerized records.  He found that, as of 1962, the 
apartment building was reported to contain fifteen units.  
Assistant tax assessor Michael Jaeger (―Jaeger‖) testified at a 
Federal Rule of Evidence 104 hearing before the District 
Court that the property record card showed that the building 
had sixteen physical units, was the most current and accurate 
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record maintained by the Tax Department, and was the record 
upon which the WNY Building Department relied to 
determine the number of units in a building.  Jaeger could not 
attest to whether Zanardelli had reviewed this document.  
Zanardelli testified that he did not review this property record 
card.  According to Friedman, Zanardelli intentionally 
overlooked the property record card, which indicated that the 
building had sixteen physical units.       
On August 30, 2007, Friedman and Zanardelli met at 
the apartment building.  Friedman said to Zanardelli that the 
apartment was ―existing‖ and ―not something that was created 
yesterday or a year ago.‖  (Id. at 988.)  Zanardelli responded 
that ―[i]t‘s not on your paperwork and it‘s not on anything.‖  
(Id.)  Friedman said, ―so you found an existing apartment 
which wasn‘t there, you, you put it on.  It‘s not, it‘s not the 
first time this happens.‖  (Id.)  Zanardelli answered, ―No . . . 
this unit was-wasn‘t here.  Wasn‘t there‖ and that ―[y]ou‘re 
gonna have to go for a variance.  That‘s it.  I mean, I mean 
what are you gonna do.‖  (Id. at 989.)  Friedman replied, 
―Well, you know what you could do, what you can do?‖ and 
Zanardelli asked, ―So what are you suggesting here?‖  (Id. 
989-990.)  Friedman responded with, ―You tell me . . . 
Whatever it is.‖  (Id. at 990.)  Zanardelli replied, ―I can‘t tell 
you, you tell me.‖  (Id.)   
Friedman used hand gestures to indicate that 
Zanardelli should write down a monetary amount; Zanardelli 
refused to write anything down and Friedman used hand 
gestures to offer a bribe of $2,000, then $3,000 and ultimately 
of $5,000.  The parties agree that Friedman offered to pay 
$5,000 to Zanardelli, in lieu of seeking a variance from the 
zoning board.  In return, Zanardelli would issue a C.O. 
approving the undocumented apartment.  
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After the agreement was brokered, Zanardelli held the 
violation in abeyance and dismissed the complaint.  
Zanardelli called Friedman on September 10, 2007, 
September 13, 2007, and October 18, 2007.  Friedman did not 
return his calls.  In November 2007, Zanardelli reinstated the 
complaint against Friedman, at the direction of the FBI, to 
pressure Friedman.  Zanardelli called Friedman again on 
February 6, 2008, March 10, 2008, March 14, 2008, and 
March 24, 2008.  Friedman, again, did not respond.   
Meanwhile, Friedman placed the building on the 
market for $1,350,000.  In February 2008, he had located a 
potential buyer, Steven Steiner (―Steiner‖), who was willing 
to pay $1,150,000, but only if the sixteenth apartment was 
properly approved by the municipality.  With the sale in 
jeopardy, Friedman sent an associate to persuade Zanardelli 
to issue the C.O.  Zanardelli responded that Friedman had two 
weeks to remove the illegal apartment, seek a variance from 
the board, or ―let him . . . know what he want[s] to do.‖ (Id. at 
1011-12.)   
On March 25, 2008, Steiner‘s attorney threatened to 
abandon the sale unless Friedman was able to deliver the 
building with sixteen approved units.  That same day, almost 
seven months after Friedman agreed to the bribe, he paid 
Zanardelli $5,000 in cash and asked that the C.O. be issued 
immediately.  Friedman called Zanardelli numerous times 
that day to inquire about the C.O., but Zanardelli never issued 
it.  Friedman did not make the sale to Steiner.   
 On February 26, 2009, Friedman was indicted on one 
count of bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).  A jury 
trial commenced on November 16, 2009.  During the trial, the 
District Court excluded Jaeger‘s testimony that the property 
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record card showed that the building had sixteen units and 
was the most current record maintained and used by the 
WNY Building Department.  The District Court excluded the 
testimony as it was ―distracting . . . it‘s a whimsical argument 
that this is somehow related to entrapment‖ and ―Mr. Jaeger‘s 
testimony doesn‘t seem to me to be pertinent or relevant 
because I just don‘t see any relevance to it, quite frankly.‖  
(Id. at 627, 639.)   
 During trial, the District Court also limited the 
testimony of Zanardelli and Acosta.  The Government‘s 
disclosure listed twenty-two properties for which Zanardelli 
had received money to facilitate building approvals.  
Zanardelli testified about these bribes during direct 
examination.  During cross-examination, the District Court 
allowed Friedman to question Zanardelli generally about the 
twenty-two properties, but did not allow counsel to continue 
Zanardelli‘s cross-examination with respect to details about 
each individual property and bribes solicited once Zanardelli 
had indicated that he did not remember specific details.  The 
District Court reasoned: ―I just want to make sure that we 
make the best use of our time.  Now, to go through every one 
of those, the point has been made.  The details of that is really 
not this case.‖  (Id. at 373.) 
 Friedman was permitted to question Zanardelli 
generally on the bribes and whether he had solicited the 
bribes or had been approached about the bribes.  Zanardelli 
was asked on cross-examination, ―but there were bribes that 
you solicited, right?  That‘s what you pleaded guilty to.‖  (Id. 
at 378.)  Later, Zanardelli was asked at least three more times:  
―Were people just coming in and offering you bribes?‖ (Id. at 
386), ―Were there times when you solicited bribes and people 
refused to pay them?‖ (Id. at 387), and ―Were there times 
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when you asked for [bribes] and people refused to pay them?‖ 
(Id. at 388).   
 Additionally, the District Court permitted cross-
examination of Acosta generally regarding his fifty-four 
building code violations, but did not permit questioning of 
each of the fifty-four violations, individually.  When the 
District Court instructed Friedman‘s counsel to ask general 
questions about the issue but avoid specific questions with 
regard to every single violation, Friedman‘s attorney 
responded that he ―wasn‘t planning on it.‖  (Id.)   
 Prior to trial, the Government had provided the defense 
with a disclosure letter, pursuant to Giglio, which included 
the following paragraph: 
Silvio Acosta has identified 
approximately 11 properties for 
which he was told by Zanardelli 
or Thomas O‘Malley, who was 
Zanardelli‘s successor, to 
disregard apparent violations.  
The properties include 
Zanardelli‘s residence, although 
Acosta is not aware that the 
property belongs to Zanardelli.  
Acosta states that this behavior 
started approximately two years 
ago.    
 (Appellant‘s Br. at 42.)  At trial, Acosta testified that 
Zanardelli or his successor, O‘Malley, never told him to 
ignore violations for eleven properties and the Government 
did not identify eleven properties for which Acosta was told 
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to ignore apparent violations.  The Government represented to 
the District Court that Mr. Acosta had not retracted his 
statement during witness preparations and that ―[t]he first 
time we heard about it was when Mr. Acosta testified.  It 
came as a surprise to us just like it came as a surprise to 
[Appellant].‖  (App. at 195.)  The District Court denied a 
motion for mistrial, explaining that there was not sufficient 
prejudice and that Appellant had every opportunity to cross-
examine Acosta on the issue.  Notably, the District Court also 
stated that ―[w]hatever [was] said during [Friedman‘s 
counsel‘s] opening statement with regard to this had so little 
traction I don‘t remember it.  I daresay most of the jurors 
wouldn‘t have remembered it.‖  (Id.)   
 The Government also submitted discovery to Friedman 
of a statement made by Friedman‘s real estate broker, Scott 
Callahan (―Callahan‖), to the FBI that Friedman told Callahan 
that the town did not consider one of Friedman‘s apartments 
to be legal.  The Government concedes that it interviewed 
Callahan at a later date and at that time, he denied having 
made the above-mentioned statement.  At trial, Callahan 
testified that Friedman had not immediately disclosed the 
illegal apartment to Callahan.   
 On November 19, 2009, the District Court gave the 
government‘s proposed instruction on the theory of defense:  
 It is not a defense to the 
crime of bribery that a defendant 
claims he was coerced or extorted 
into paying a bribe.  Extortion and 
coercion are not a defense to 
bribery.  The reason for this is that 




integrity, even where an official 
solicits money to do acts that the 
official is obligated to do anyway.  
The correct decision in such a 
situation is to refuse the elicit [sic] 
overture and to report it to the 
appropriate authorities, not to pay 
the bribe.   
In addition, it is not a defense to 
bribery that the official action that 
was the subject of the bribe might 
have been lawful.  It makes no 
difference whether the official 
action sought to be influenced 
was right or wrong.  That is, it 
makes no difference that the bribe 
giver may have paid the official to 
perform an act to which the bribe 
giver was legally entitled.   
(Id. at 683.)     
 Friedman‘s proposed instruction with respect to the 
theory of defense:  
It is not a complete defense to the 
crime of bribery that a defendant 
claims he was coerced or extorted 
into making a payment to a public 
official.  That is, you cannot find 
the defendant not guilty of the 
bribery charged simply because 
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he was the victim of extortion by 
the public official whom he paid.  
However, the fact that the 
defendant was extorted or 
coerced, while it is not alone a 
defense to the charge, may bear 
upon whether the defendant ever 
formed the intent required to 
commit the crime of bribery, 
specifically upon whether he 
committed the act, ―willfully,‖ 
that is, with a purpose to disobey 
or disregard the law.   
―Extortion‖ means obtaining 
property from another, with his 
consent, in either one of two 
ways:  [] inducing or bringing 
about this consent through the use 
of actual or threatened force, 
violence or fear, which can 
include fear of economic harm or 
hardship, which exists if a victim 
experiences anxiety, concern, or 
worry over expected personal 
economic harm, and which fear 
must be reasonable under the 
circumstances existing at the time 
of the defendant‘s actions.   
As I also explained to you earlier, 
a person may be guilty of bribery 
whether or not the official action 
sought to be influenced was right 
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or wrong.  That is, a bribery 
defendant may be guilty even if 
he paid the official to perform an 
act to which the defendant was 
legally entitled.   
However, you may consider 
whether the defendant believed 
that he was paying the official to 
perform an act to which he 
believed he was legally entitled in 
evaluating whether the 
government has proven that the 
defendant had the intent required 
to commit the bribery at issue, 
that is, whether the government 
has proven that he had the 
purpose to disobey or disregard 
the law.   
(Appellant‘s Br. at 19-20.)   The District Court rejected 
Friedman‘s proposed instruction, stating, ―I think that‘s 
confusing.  I have thought about it.  I‘ve read your 
submission.  I reject it.  I think it‘s confusing.‖  (App. at 649-
50.)   
 The jury convicted Friedman of bribery.  Following 
the conviction, Friedman filed a motion for a new trial based 
on the District Court‘s denial of Jaeger‘s testimony, the 
limitation on Acosta and Zanardelli‘s cross-examination, and 
the Government‘s failure to disclose Giglio and Brady 
material to the defense regarding Acosta and Callahan.  The 
District Court denied the new trial motion.   
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 In Friedman‘s sentencing memorandum he raised 
several arguments.  Most prominently, he raised the issue of 
unwarranted disparities in sentences, pursuant to § 
3553(a)(6).  In particular, he emphasized that based on his 
proposed Guidelines sentence, there would be a significant 
disparity in his sentence as compared to Anthony Lam, who 
was convicted of the same offense—making a cash payment 
of $5,000 to Zanardelli, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
666(a)(2)—and received a sentence of three years‘ probation.  
Likewise, Friedman contended that his sentence, as proposed 
by the Guidelines, would be disparate from Zanardelli‘s 24-
month sentence, which had already been imposed by the 
District Court. 
 Friedman also moved for a downward departure from 
the Sentencing Guidelines, arguing that he had committed the 
offense because of ―serious coercion, blackmail or duress, 
under circumstances not amounting to a complete defense.‖  
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12.  The District Court sentenced Friedman to 
a 34-month term of imprisonment and a $25,000 fine.   
The District Court began the sentencing proceeding by 
discussing the loss calculation.  The District Court 
acknowledged that both the Presentence Report and the 
Government concluded that the total offense level should be 
22 and a term of imprisonment for that level would be 41 to 
51 months, based on a net value of the benefit of $67,647.  
Friedman‘s counsel argued that the only certain figure was 
the $5,000 bribe; as such, the total offense level should be 16, 
with a term of imprisonment of 21 to 27 months.   




Neither calculation, it 
seems to me, is perfect or 
altogether satisfying.  [Defense 
counsel] is correct when he says 
that when you start going into the 
facts and try to determine, well, 
what was the . . . building going 
to sell for with or without that 
apartment, going at it backwards, 
forwards, is not a totally 
satisfying exercise . . . . Mr. 
Friedman has a criminal history of 
1, and so everything in terms of 
where in the guidelines one would 
find the correct and accurate 
number depends on how one 
determines the net value of the 
benefit here.   
I think it‘s somewhere in between, 
quite frankly.  I think there‘s no 
question but the $5,000 bribe just 
in and of itself does not adequate 
[sic] and fairly produce the value, 
and the guideline language of the 
manual suggests that only if that‘s 
the last alternative, would you 
turn to the amount of the exact 
bribe. 
(Id. at 957-58.)   
 Later, the District Court stated, ―it seems to me that 
something less than the 22 is fair in this case, but I do think 
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that a custodial sentence should be imposed, and I do think 
that a sentence of 34 months is a fair sentence in this case.  
And the Court intends to impose it.‖  (Id. at 962.)     
 At the end of the sentencing proceeding, the 
Government requested clarification on the District Court‘s 
Guideline calculation, explaining that it had ―inferred from 
[the District Court‘s] comments, Your Honor, that you had 
said that the value was somewhere between the 67 that we 
argued for and the 5 of the defense.‖  (Id. at 967.)  The 
District Court replied, ―That‘s correct.‖  (Id.)  The 
Government further inquired, ―[a]nd so the range that‘s in the 
middle of that is 10 to 30, which would be a plus 4 
enhancement, make [sic] him a Level 20 with a 33- to 41-
month range.‖  (Id.)  The District Court concluded that, ―34 
would be a Level 20.  Or it could be Level 19 because it 
would be in the middle of -- and it could be – yeah, it could 
be a 19 or a 20 . . . . If you‘d like me to say it‘s a specific 
number, it‘s either 19 or 20.‖  (Id. at 967-68.)     
 The District Court, after hearing arguments regarding a 
downward departure based on coercion, blackmail, or duress, 
stated at the sentencing proceeding:  
I am convinced based on 
the testimony at the trial, listening 
to it carefully, that the defendant 
thought about [the bribe], seemed 
to have no moral objection to it, 
seemed willing, but then wasn‘t – 
couldn‘t – did nothing for a while.  
But I am absolutely persuaded 
from the testimony on the – the 
tape recordings and everything I 
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heard, that he really wanted to sell 
this building when the opportunity 
appeared, and it was his 
anxious—anxiousness to sell that 
building to[o] quickly not [to] go 
the whole nine yards, but to 
quickly get that certificate of 
occupancy, which motivated him 
to just pay the bribe and get it 
over with.  And so he did, as we 
saw in the video.   
(Id. at 959.) 
The District Court went on to say: 
I think that 34 months is 
[a] fair sentence, and I‘ve 
considered the nature of the 
offense, I‘ve considered the 
offender himself, the full penalty 
of the trial.  This is not a case in 
which I impose [the] sentence 
based on a guilty plea, where I 
don‘t get to know anything about 
the facts of the case.  I sat here 
and listened to the witnesses 
testify.  And so I sensed and 
became – was able to absorb the 
interior of this fact pattern.  I 
considered that.  I considered the 
seriousness of the offense and the 
other factors which have been set 
forth as the 3553 factors. 
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(Id. at 963.)  The District Court also noted that it was required 
to ―consider a fairness with regard to other offenders who are 
sentenced by this Court.‖  (Id. at 961.)   
 In the District Court‘s Statement of Reasons, it 
explained that it ―lowered the ‗net value of the benefit‘ in the 
[Presentence Report] because of its uncertainty.  Instead of 
imposing [a] sentence at level 22, [the District Court] 
imposed a sentence at a level 20 (although 34 months custody 
is also embraced within a level 19).‖  (Id. at 8.)  Next, the 
District Court stated that it ―reject[ed] the notion that the 
$5,000 bribe figure should determine the offense level under 
the guidelines.‖  (Id.)   
 The District Court entered the Judgment of Conviction 
and sentence.  Friedman filed a timely appeal.   
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction to review challenges to 
a conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and challenges to the 
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review the District 
Court‘s refusal to give specific jury instructions for abuse of 
discretion, but exercise plenary review over whether the 
District Court gave a correct statement of law in its jury 
instructions.  United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 74 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 213-14 (3d 
Cir. 2009), but even erroneous rulings only require a new trial 
if the ruling affects a ―substantial right of the party,‖ FED R. 
EVID. 103(a).  An error in an evidentiary ruling is harmless 
error when ―it is highly probable that the error did not affect 
the result.‖  Hill v. Laeisz, 435 F.3d 404, 420 (3d Cir. 2006).  
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 This Court will only reverse a district court‘s 
limitation on cross-examination where the limitation ―is so 
severe as to constitute a denial of the defendant‘s right to 
confront witnesses against him and it is prejudicial to 
substantial rights of the defendant.‖  United States v. Casoni, 
950 F.2d 893, 918-19 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).   The District Court‘s decision 
to limit cross-examination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Ellis, 156 F.3d 493, 498 (3d Cir. 1998). 
When a motion for a new trial is based on a Brady 
claim, we ―conduct a de novo review of the district court‘s 
conclusions of law as well as a ‗clearly erroneous‘ review of 
any findings of fact.‖  United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 
202 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).    
III.  ANALYSIS 
1. Jury Instructions 
 Friedman maintains that the District Court abused its 
discretion in rejecting his proposed jury instruction because 
Friedman argues that an instruction that coercion bears upon 
the defendant‘s state of mind is required.   
 This Court has established that ―[a] defendant is 
entitled to a theory of defense instruction if (1) he proposes a 
correct statement of the law; (2) his theory is supported by the 
evidence; (3) the theory of defense is not part of the charge; 
and (4) the failure to include an instruction of the defendant‘s 
theory would deny him a fair trial.‖  United States v. 
Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 176 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 
Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 1999) (―A court errs in 
19 
 
refusing a requested instruction only if the omitted instruction 
is correct, is not substantially covered by other instructions, 
and is so important that its omission prejudiced the 
defendant.‖).  We have cautioned that a defendant is ―not 
entitled to a judicial narrative of his version of the facts, even 
[if] such a narrative is, in one sense of the phrase, a ‗theory of 
defense.‘‖  Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 176 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).     
 Friedman has not established that his proposed jury 
instruction was a correct statement of the law—that coercion 
or extortion bears upon the defendant‘s state of mind for 
bribery.  Friedman presents no support for his proposition that 
coercion bears upon the specific intent, or lack thereof, for 
bribery.   
 Friedman concedes that it is a matter of first 
impression in this Circuit whether the defendant is entitled to 
an instruction that extortion or coercion, while not a complete 
defense to bribery under § 666, may bear upon whether the 
defendant ever formed sufficient intent to commit the crime.  
Nothing in Supreme Court precedent, this Court‘s precedent 
or the Third Circuit Model Jury instructions for bribery under 
§ 666(a)(2) requires an instruction that coercion or extortion 
be considered by the jury for the defendant‘s intent to bribe.1   
                                              
1
 The Third Circuit Model Jury Instructions for 18 U.S.C. 
§ 666(a)(2) is as follows:  
 
 Count (No.) of the 
indictment charges the defendant 
(name) with (describe offense; 
e.g., bribing an agent of a 
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federally funded program), which 
is a violation of federal law.   
 
 In order to find the 
defendant guilty of this offense, 
you must find that the government 
proved each of the following five 
elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt: 
 
 First:  That at the time 
alleged in the indictment, (name 
of agent) was an agent of (specify 
organization, government, or 
agency);  
 
 Second: That (specify 
organization, government or 
agency) received federal benefits 
in excess of $10,000 in a one-year 
period;  
 
 Third: That (name) [(gave) 
(agreed to give) (offered)] 
something of value to (name of 
agent);  
 
 Fourth: That (name) acted 
corruptly with the intent to 
influence or reward (name of 
agent) with respect to (the 
business) (a transaction) (a series 
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 Friedman asserts that his proposed instruction is 
correct law in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit.  Hence, although a correct statement of law in 
that Circuit, its value within the confines of Hoffecker, is 
limited.  Moreover, the instruction approved in the Second 
Circuit is more limited in scope than Friedman‘s proposed 
instruction.  Specifically, the Second Circuit has found that 
coercion can bear on the intent required for the commission 
of bribery only where: (1) the defendant is paying the official 
to perform an act to which he is legally entitled and (2) the 
official threatens the defendant with ―serious economic loss‖ 
unless the bribe is paid.  See United States v. Barash, 365 
F.2d 395, 401-02 (2d Cir. 1966).   
 Friedman‘s proposed instruction, in contrast, did not 
limit the consideration of coercion to situations in which the 
defendant was legally entitled to the act.  While his proposed 
instruction did include an explanation that the jury could 
consider whether the defendant believed that he was paying 
Zanardelli for an act to which he was legally entitled, it would 
have charged the jury that extortion or coercion ―may bear 
upon whether the defendant ever formed the intent required to 
commit the crime of bribery,‖ even when the defendant was 
not legally entitled to the act.  (Appellant‘s Br. at 19.)        
                                                                                                     
of transactions) of (specify 
organization, government or 
agency); 
 Fifth:  That the value of the 
(business) (transaction) (series of 
transactions) to which the 




 Friedman argues that his proposed instruction is 
supported by the language of the federal statute for bribery 
under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 666.  The bribery 
statute criminalizes the actions of an individual who 
―corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to 
any person, with intent to influence or reward‖ a government 
agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.  18 
U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).  According to Friedman, forming corrupt 
intent can be negated by coercion, because coercive conduct 
by Zanardelli could have influenced Friedman‘s state of 
mind, and that the jury should have been charged accordingly.  
We reject this argument.   
 In Hoffecker, this Court was faced with a similar 
argument, namely that a theory of defense to negate intent in 
a material misrepresentation case should have been permitted 
in a jury charge to explain that the defendants lacked intent.  
530 F.3d at 177.  However, this Court rejected that argument 
on the basis that it duplicated other instructions that the 
District Court gave on the subject of criminal intent, such as 
instructions on ―knowingly and willfully‖ and the ―good faith 
defense‖ to fraud.  Id. 
 Likewise, in this case, Friedman‘s argument is that his 
proposed theory of defense instruction would negate the 
intent requirement set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).  But, the 
District Court provided thorough instructions as to the 
elements of bribery under the relevant statute, defining 
―knowingly,‖ ―corruptly,‖ and ―willfully.‖  (App. at 679-80.)  
In particular, the District Court instructed the jury that it may 
consider ―all the other facts and circumstances shown by the 
evidence that may prove what was in his mind at the time‖ 
and whether Friedman had intended a lawful or unlawful end.  
(Id. at 679.)  Thus, the jury was free to consider all 
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circumstances and arguments set forth by Friedman as to why 
the element of intent was not satisfied and the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying a separate instruction 
on intent.    
Even if Friedman‘s proposed jury instruction was a 
correct statement of the law, Friedman‘s instruction on 
coercion or extortion is not supported by the evidence in the 
record.  The facts in this case do not constitute coercion or 
extortion.  Friedman did not bribe Zanardelli in exchange for 
an act to which he was legally entitled.  He gave the bribe to 
Zanardelli in exchange for the illegal act of Zanardelli 
legalizing the sixteenth unit without a variance.  Additionally, 
Zanardelli did not threaten Friedman with economic loss.  
Zanardelli frequently clarified that Friedman could proceed 
through the normal route of applying for a variance.  
Although obtaining a variance requires time and money, it is 
the correct legal process that should have been followed and 
informing someone of the correct, legal steps they should 
take, in itself, is not threatening serious economic loss.  That 
Friedman would likely lose a potential buyer for his 
apartment building is also not Zanardelli threatening 
Friedman with serious economic loss.  There is no evidence 
that the potential buyer‘s threat to pull out of the deal was 
influenced by Zanardelli‘s action.     
In light of our conclusion that Friedman‘s proposed 
instruction was not a correct statement of law, nor was his 
theory supported by the facts, we need not discuss whether 
the failure to include an instruction would have denied 
Friedman a fair trial.   
2. Exclusion of Witness Testimony 
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 Friedman asserts that the District Court erred in 
precluding assistant tax assessor Michael Jaeger‘s testimony.  
As a result, he requests reversal of the conviction and remand 
for a new trial.  We disagree.   
 Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides that ―[a]ll 
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided 
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, 
by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court pursuant to statutory authority.  Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible.‖  FED. R. EVID. 402.  Under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 401, ―‗[r]elevant evidence‘ means 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.‖  FED. R. EVID. 401.   
 Evidence that is relevant may still be excluded ―if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.‖  FED. R. EVID. 
403.  The District Court‘s discretion is ―construed especially 
broadly in the context of Rule 403.‖  United States v. Kemp, 
500 F.3d 257, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 Jaeger testified at a Federal Rule of Evidence 104 
hearing that the property record card showed that the building 
had sixteen units, was the most current and accurate record 
maintained by the Tax Department, and was the record upon 
which the WNY Building Department relied to determine the 
number of units in a building.  The District Court excluded 
this testimony because it was distracting and not relevant.    
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 Friedman argues that Jaeger‘s testimony shows that 
Zanardelli induced Friedman‘s payment by claiming that the 
records showed that the building had only fifteen units, when 
the records actually reflected sixteen units.  From this 
evidence, Friedman contends, the jury could have inferred 
that Zanardelli induced Friedman‘s payment.    
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
precluding Jaeger‘s testimony.  While Jaeger did testify as to 
the number of physical units reported on the card, his 
testimony was clear that the property record card indicated, in 
handwritten notes by Jaeger‘s secretary, that the number of 
physical units was sixteen.  Nowhere in Jaeger‘s testimony 
does he say that the number of legal units was sixteen.  It is 
undisputed that the building physically had sixteen units, thus 
testimony about the number of physical units is not relevant.   
 Moreover, Jaeger testified at the Rule 104 hearing that 
that he did not have knowledge of whether Zanardelli had 
seen the property record card.  This renders his testimony not 
relevant to support Friedman‘s theory that Zanardelli lied to 
Friedman about what the property record card reflected.  
Zanardelli responded on cross-examination that he had not 
seen the tax records.  Friedman could have argued, without 
Jaeger‘s testimony, that Zanardelli intentionally overlooked 
the tax records, thus Jaeger‘s testimony that he did not know 
whether Zanardelli saw the records is not relevant.  There was 
no error here; thus, we need not determine whether the error 
was harmless.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in rejecting Jaeger‘s testimony.   
3. Limitation of Cross-Examination 
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 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution provides that, ―[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .‖  U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI.  Yet, the Confrontation Clause does not grant 
unfettered rights to cross-examine witnesses.  ―[T]he 
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective 
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might 
wish.‖  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States 
v. Casoni, 950 F.2d at 919 (―Van Arsdall requires us to strike 
a balance between the constitutionally required opportunity to 
cross-examine and the need to prevent repetitive or abusive 
cross-examination.‖).  District courts have discretion to 
―impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based 
on concerns about, among other things, . . . interrogation that 
is repetitive or only marginally relevant.‖  Van Arsdall, 475 
U.S. at 679.
2
      
Friedman claims that his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation was violated because the District Court limited 
the scope of cross-examination regarding both Zanardelli and 
Acosta.  While the District Court did limit the extent of 
Friedman‘s cross-examination, it was not violative of the 
                                              
2
 Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) states: ―The court shall 
exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) 
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the 
ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of 
time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue 
embarrassment.‖  FED. R. EVID. 611(a). 
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Constitution.  The District Court permitted the full scope of 
cross-examination of Zanardelli regarding money he had 
received on twenty-two properties to facilitate building 
approvals but limited the specific details that could be delved 
into.  Most important, Friedman was still permitted to 
question Zanardelli generally on these matters.   
Friedman‘s cross-examination of Zanardelli sought to 
obtain information regarding the amount of the bribes, what 
Zanardelli did with the bribe money he received, and the 
identities of multiple people from whom Zanardelli received 
bribes.  Friedman argues that he should have been permitted 
to show through cross-examination that Zanardelli solicited 
bribes, rather than merely accepted bribes.  But the District 
Court allowed multiple opportunities to obtain this testimony.  
Friedman‘s counsel asked on cross-examination, ―but there 
were bribes that you solicited, right?  That‘s what you 
pleaded guilty to.‖  (App. at 378.)  Later, Zanardelli was 
asked:  ―Were people just coming in and offering you 
bribes?‖ (Id. at 386); ―Were there times when you solicited 
bribes and people refused to pay them?‖ (Id. at 387); and 
―Were there times when you asked for [bribes] and people 
refused to pay them?‖ (Id. at 388).   
Zanardelli responded, on the record, to these questions.  
The jury heard direct evidence and admissions of Zanardelli‘s 
wrongdoing.  The District Court‘s limitation was reasonable 
and did not deny Friedman his Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses against him.  The District Court did not 
abuse its discretion by limiting Friedman‘s ability to cross-
examine Zanardelli.   
Similarly, the District Court permitted cross-
examination of Acosta generally regarding fifty-four 
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violations of the building code, that he failed to accurately 
report, as part of his inspection duties.  On the other hand, the 
District Court did not permit questioning regarding each and 
every one of the individual fifty-four violations.  Friedman 
asserts that this limitation prevented him from demonstrating 
that Acosta manipulated the building code rules that he 
should have been enforcing and that this manipulation 
pressured Friedman into bribing Zanardelli to get around the 
building code.  This argument lacks merit.   
Friedman‘s counsel sought to solicit information 
during cross-examination regarding Acosta‘s citations for 
violations of the building code and that he had previously 
made misrepresentations regarding building units.  However, 
Friedman‘s counsel‘s statement at trial undercuts the 
argument.  When instructed to ask general questions about the 
violations, but to avoid questions regarding each and every 
specific violation, Friedman‘s attorney stated candidly that he 
―wasn‘t planning on it.‖  (Id. at 171.)  Friedman‘s counsel had 
not intended to cross-examine Acosta on the individual 
building code violations anyway.   
The District Court‘s limitation was reasonable and did 
not deny Friedman his Sixth Amendment right to confront 
witnesses against him.  The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in limiting Friedman‘s cross-examination of 
Acosta.     
With respect to both Zanardelli and Acosta, Friedman 
had the opportunity to cross-examine them on their alleged 
wrongdoing and the limitation on cross-examination did not 
inhibit the argument that Acosta and Zanardelli engaged in 
malfeasance.  The jury learned of the full extent of Acosta‘s 
and Zanardelli‘s malfeasance and criminal activity.  The 
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District Court‘s ruling on the scope of cross-examination with 
respect to Zanardelli and Acosta is consistent with Van 
Arsdall that Friedman does not have the unfettered right to 
cross-examination.      
4. Giglio 
Friedman argues that the Government violated Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150 (1972) because it concealed certain 
impeachment evidence related to Acosta and Callahan. 
Brady stands for the proposition that ―the suppression 
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith 
or bad faith of the prosecution.‖  373 U.S. at 87.  Under 
Giglio, ―the government must disclose materials that go to the 
question of guilt or innocence as well as materials that might 
affect the jury‘s judgment of the credibility of a crucial 
prosecution witness.‖  United States v. Milan, 304 F.3d 273, 
287 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 
667, 676–77 (1985)).  A defendant must prove three elements 
for a Brady violation: (1) ―the evidence at issue must be 
favorable to the defendant;‖ (2) ―it must be material;‖ and (3) 
―it must have been suppressed by the prosecution.‖  United 
States v. Reyeros, 537 F.3d 270, 281 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citing Pelullo, 399 F.3d at 209; United States v. Perdomo, 
929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
Evidence is material ―only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.‖ United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  
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Material evidence can include evidence that may be used to 
impeach a witness.  Id. at 676-77; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 
154.  However, ―impeachment evidence, if cumulative of 
similar impeachment evidence used at trial . . . is superfluous 
and therefore has little, if any, probative value.‖  Lambert v. 
Beard, 633 F.3d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations 
omitted).  On the other hand, it does not follow ―that 
whenever a witness is impeached in one manner, any other 
impeachment becomes immaterial.‖  Id.   
 Here, Friedman argues that he was disadvantaged 
because the Government failed to disclose Acosta‘s change in 
testimony.  Originally, Acosta had identified properties for 
which Zanardelli, or Zanardelli‘s successor, had told him to 
disregard apparent violations.  Later, on cross-examination, 
Acosta denied this assertion.  The defense argued that this 
change was material and a violation of Giglio and Brady to 
suppress it.  The District Court found that the Government did 
not suppress the change in Acosta‘s testimony or intentionally 
mislead Friedman because the Government was not aware of 
the change in Acosta‘s testimony until Acosta was cross-
examined at trial.  This finding was not clearly erroneous.   
 Friedman chose not to cross-examine Acosta on the 
inconsistency of his prior statement and the District Court 
noted that Friedman‘s opening statement regarding Acosta‘s 
pre-trial statements were not central to his defense.  
Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
holding that Friedman was not prejudiced by the lack of prior 
knowledge of the change of testimony.  Further, the result of 
the trial would not have been different if the change had been 
disclosed.   
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 Next, Friedman requests a new trial based on the 
Government‘s failure to disclose a change in testimony by a 
real estate broker, Callahan.  The Government provided 
discovery to Friedman that Callahan had told the FBI that 
early in the process of preparing the building for listing to 
sell, Friedman told Callahan that the Town of WNY did not 
consider one of the apartments to be legal.  Callahan later 
denied ever making that statement.  Friedman asserts that he 
would have used Callahan‘s statement to argue that he did not 
have a corrupt intent in bribing Zanardelli because he was 
honest in his disclosure to Callahan about the illegal unit.  
According to Friedman, the Government‘s failure to disclose 
this change in testimony about whether Friedman disclosed to 
Callahan that the unit was illegal deprived Friedman of the 
opportunity to argue that he did not have a corrupt intent to 
bribe.  The Government concedes that the change in 
testimony may reflect on Callahan‘s credibility and that it 
should have been disclosed to Friedman. 
 The question that remains given the concession is 
whether the failure to disclose the change in testimony 
amounts to a constitutional deprivation requiring the ordering 
of a new trial.  The District Court found that it did not.  This 
finding is not clearly erroneous.  Callahan‘s testimony 
regarding whether Friedman told him about the illegal 
apartment is not relevant regarding whether Friedman had a 
corrupt intent in bribing Zanardelli.  The evidence implicating 
Friedman was that he bribed Zanardelli in exchange for a 
C.O. to legalize the sixteenth unit.  Although the Government 
concealed evidence from Friedman that may have been 
favorable to Friedman, the evidence was not material.  There 
is not a reasonable probability that the result of the 
proceeding would have been different if the Government had 
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disclosed Callahan‘s change in testimony regarding what 
Friedman had told Callahan about the illegal unit.  The 
District Court did not err in denying Friedman‘s motion for 
mistrial.   
5. Procedural and Substantive Unreasonableness in 
Sentencing 
 
Friedman argues that his sentence is procedurally 
unreasonable because the District Court did not (1) follow the 
proper order of the steps set forth in Gunter; (2) compute a 
definitive loss calculation or offense level to reach the 
Guidelines range; (3) formally rule on Friedman‘s departure 
motion; or (4) meaningfully consider the § 3553(a) factors.  
Friedman also argues that his sentence is substantively 
unreasonable.   
 
Here, the District Court did not follow the correct 
order of the steps set forth in Gunter, did not compute a 
definitive loss calculation or offense level to reach its 
Guidelines range nor did it meaningfully consider § 
3553(a)(6), ―the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct.‖  18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(6).  Based on these procedural errors, we will remand 
to the District Court for resentencing.  
  
Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), we directed district courts to follow a three-step 
sentencing process.  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 
247 (3d Cir. 2006).  During the first step, a district court must 
―calculate a defendant‘s Guidelines sentence precisely as they 
would have before Booker.‖  Id. (citation omitted).  During 
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the second step, district courts ―must ‗formally rul[e] on the 
motions of both parties and stat[e] on the record whether they 
are granting a departure and how that departure affects the 
Guidelines calculation, and tak[e] into account [our] Circuit‘s 
pre-Booker case law, which continues to have advisory 
force.‘‖  Id. (alterations in Gunter) (citation omitted).  During 
the third step, district courts must ―‗exercise [] [their] 
discretion by considering the relevant [§3553(a)] factors‘3 in 
                                              
3
  The § 3553(a) factors include:  
(1) the nature and circumstances 
of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant;  
(2) the need for the sentence 
imposed - -  
(A) to reflect the seriousness of 
the offense, to promote respect for 
the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense;  
(B) to afford adequate deterrence 
to criminal conduct;  
(C) to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant; 
and  
(D) to provide the defendant with 
needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other 
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setting the sentence they impose regardless of whether it 
varies from the sentence calculated under the Guidelines.‖  Id.  
                                                                                                     
correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner;  
(3) the kinds of sentences 
available;  
(4) the kinds of sentence and the 
sentencing range established for - 
-  
(A) the applicable category of 
offense committed by the 
applicable category of defendant 
as set forth in the guidelines . . . ;  
(5) any pertinent policy statement 
. . . issued by the Sentencing 
Commission . . . [that] is in effect 
on the date the defendant is 
sentenced;  
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records 
who have been found guilty of 
similar conduct; and  
(7) the need to provide restitution 
to any victims of the offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
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(alterations in Gunter) (citation omitted).  During the third 
step, district courts should engage in ―a true, considered 
exercise of discretion . . . including a recognition of, and 
response to, the parties‘ non-frivolous arguments.‖  United 
States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation 
omitted). 
 
Appellate review is limited to determining whether the 
sentence is reasonable.  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 
203, 213 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  Our review for 
reasonableness proceeds in two stages:  (1) ―First, we ensure 
that the district court committed no ‗significant procedural 
error,‘ ‗such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) 
the Guidelines rage, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, 
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence 
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 
explain the chosen sentence‖ and (2) ―if the district court‘s 
procedures are sound, we proceed to examine the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence.‖  Id. at 214 (quoting United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009); Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)) (citation omitted); 
United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(―[W]e are to ensure that a substantively reasonable sentence 
has been imposed in a procedurally fair way.‖).  At both the 
procedural and substantive stages, this Court reviews for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Negroni, 638 F.3d 434, 
443 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).   
 
To demonstrate that a sentence is procedurally 
reasonable, a district court must show ―meaningful 
consideration of the relevant statutory factors and the exercise 
of independent judgment.‖  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 
556, 571-72 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 
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848 (2007).  A major variance from the sentencing Guidelines 
may require a more significant justification than a minor one.  
Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 
 
We will affirm a procedurally sound sentence as 
substantively reasonable ―unless no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided.‖  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  We focus on the totality 
of the circumstances, and the party challenging the sentence 
bears the burden of proving the sentence‘s unreasonableness.  
Id. at 567.  ―[W]hile reviewing courts may presume that a 
sentence within the advisory Guidelines is reasonable, 
appellate judges must still always defer to the sentencing 
judge‘s individualized sentencing determination.‖  Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364 (2007).  ―‗[I]t is not the role 
of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the 
sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular 
sentence,‘‖ except to the extent specifically directed by 
statute.  Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 205 (1992) 
(quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983)). 
a. Order of the Gunter Steps 
Friedman argues that the District Court erred 
procedurally by analyzing the Gunter steps out of order.  The 
District Court began its sentencing procedures with the first 
Gunter step by discussing the disputed loss calculation.  
Before resolving what the loss or offense level was, the 
District Court conducted the second step of Gunter and 
discussed the departure motion.  The District Court then 
returned to a discussion of step one by resolving two other 
guidelines disputes: whether Zanardelli was a high-level 
official and whether Friedman accepted responsibility for the 
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crime.  Next, the District Court engaged in a discussion of 
some of the § 3553(a) factors, the third step of Gunter, and 
then stated that it would impose something less than a 
Guidelines level of 22 before continuing its discussion of § 
3553(a) factors.  Finally, the District Court imposed a 34-
month sentence, stating it was at an offense level of either 19 
or 20.   
The Government concedes that the District Court 
should have completed its calculation of the Guidelines range 
prior to its § 3553(a) analysis, but contends that Friedman 
fails to show that the sentencing calculation was impacted by 
the order of analysis.   
The District Court in this matter strayed from our three 
step process in Gunter.  District courts should consider the 
steps separately and sequentially.  See United States v. 
Lofink, 564 F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that it was 
not harmless error for the district court to consider a motion 
for a downward departure together with the § 3553(a) factors 
in the third step, rather than as a discrete second step of the 
process); United States v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221, 226-27 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (remanding to the district court for conflating the 
Gunter steps and failing to specify whether the below 
Guidelines range sentence was a result of a departure or a 
variance).  Following the process set forth in Gunter ensures 
that the District Court‘s decision-making process is both 
logical and fair.  Departure and variance motions logically 
cannot be determined until the district court knows what the 
Guidelines calculation is.  Likewise, the § 3553(a) factors 
cannot be consulted until after departure and variance 
motions are completed.  The fact that the District Court failed 
to adhere to this process inhibits our ability to review the 
sentence for reasonableness and thus requires remand.   
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b. Guidelines Calculation 
While the District Court ultimately concluded that it 
was imposing a 34-month sentence, it did not make any 
determinations as to what the loss calculation and total 
offense level was to lead it to the appropriate Guidelines 
range.  Rather, the District Court imposed a 34-month 
sentence and then stated that this corresponded to a Guideline 
range of 19 or 20.  Under the Supreme Court and this Court‘s 
precedent, the District Court is required to calculate the 
Guidelines range.  Gall, 552 U.S. at 597.  A sentence 
rendered without a calculation of the Guidelines range 
constitutes procedural error.  See id.  In order to determine the 
appropriate Guidelines range under step one of Gunter, the 
District Court must determine the total offense level.  Here, 
the record does not contain an explanation of how a 
Guidelines calculation of 19 or 20 was reached.  The record 
merely indicates that the District Court believed the 
Guidelines calculation should be ―somewhere in between‖ 
what the Government proposed, 22, and what the defense 
proposed, 16.  (App. at 958.)   
The District Court did not ―adequately explain the 
chosen sentence.‖  Gall, 552 U.S. at 597.  The ―failure to 
begin with a properly-calculated Guidelines range . . . 
preclude[s] this Court from concluding that [the procedural 
error] was harmless error.‖  United States v. Smalley, 517 
F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2008) (remanding to the district court 
to properly justify deviating eight months above the upper-
end of the properly calculated Guidelines range).  For this 
reason, we will remand to the District Court to explain and 
determine a specific Guidelines calculation.    
c. Departure Motion 
39 
 
Next, Friedman challenges his sentence by asserting 
that the District Court did not formally rule on his motion for 
a downward departure for coercion, blackmail, or duress.  
Under Gunter, a district court must ―formally rule on the 
motions of both parties and state on the record whether [it is] 
granting a departure and how that departure affects the 
Guidelines calculation.‖  462 F.3d at 247.  This Court has 
emphasized the importance of ruling on departure motions:  
[W]e require that the entirety of 
the Guidelines calculation be done 
correctly, including rulings on 
Guidelines departures. Put another 
way, district courts must still 
calculate what the proper 
Guidelines sentencing range is, 
otherwise the Guidelines cannot 
be considered properly at 
Gunter‘s third step. The scenario 
is simple: error entering this 
sentencing step may presage the 
sentence ultimately set. 
Lofink, 564 F.3d at 238-39 (citation omitted). 
In Rita, the Supreme Court held that the district court 
sufficiently rejected the defendant‘s request for a downward 
departure when it simply stated that without downward 
departure, the Guidelines range was not ―inappropriate‖ and 
the sentence was ―appropriate.‖  551 U.S. at 358.  The 
Supreme Court recognized that the judge could have 
explained more regarding why it rejected the defendant‘s 
downward departure motion, but noted that the ―context and 
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the record make clear that this, or similar, reasoning underlies 
the judge‘s conclusion.‖  Id. at 359.   
In this case, the District Court clearly rejected 
Friedman‘s downward departure motion.  The District Court 
explained that it was ―convinced based on the testimony at 
the trial‖ that Friedman had ―no moral objection‖ to the bribe 
and that Friedman was not the victim of extortion, but instead 
was motivated to pay the bribe in order to sell the building 
quickly and to avoid proper procedures to legalize the 
sixteenth unit.  (App. at 959.)  The District Court did not 
commit procedural error in its resolution of the departure 
motion.    
d. Meaningful Consideration of § 3553(a) Factors 
Friedman‘s final argument with respect to his sentence 
is that the District Court failed to give meaningful 
consideration to the § 3553(a) factors.   
In Booker, the Supreme Court held that appellate 
courts should insure that district courts analyze the § 3553(a) 
factors when determining sentences for criminal enterprises.  
543 U.S. at 261.  Sentencing courts must give ―meaningful 
consideration‖ to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  United 
States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 546 (3d Cir. 2009).  A 
district court‘s fail[ure] to consider the § 3553(a) factors can 
create a procedurally unreasonable sentence.  Levinson, 543 
F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008).     
―[T]he district court need not discuss and make 
findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record 
makes clear that the court took the factors into account in 
sentencing . . . .‖  United States v. Kononchuk, 485 F.3d 199, 
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204 (3d Cir. 2007).  Still, ―[w]here one party raises a 
colorable argument about the applicability of one of the 
factors, [] the court should respond to that argument as part of 
its ‗meaningful consideration of the relevant statutory factors 
and the exercise of independent judgment.‘‖  United States v. 
Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 221 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Grier, 475 
F.3d at 571-72).   
A mere recitation of the factors and a statement that 
counsel‘s arguments have been considered is insufficient, but 
―brevity is not error per se.‖  Jackson, 467 F.3d at 841-42 
(holding that the district court‘s statement that it considered 
the defendant‘s prior convictions for crimes of violence, 
circumstances of defendant‘s upbringing, and financial 
circumstances was sufficient discussion of the § 3553(a) 
factors). 
During the sentencing proceeding, the District Court 
stated that it considered the ―loving letters from family and 
friends,‖ the ―less-than-disciplined attitude‖ towards his 
income taxes, his various housing violations incurred through 
the years, and an indifference in abiding by the requirements.  
(Id. at 962.)  The District Court also generally stated that it 
had considered the § 3553(a) factors.   
 Friedman raised in his sentencing memorandum § 
3553(a)(6), ―unwarranted sentencing disparities.‖  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(6).  He referred to the sentence of Anthony Lam, 
who was convicted of the same offense—making a cash 
payment of $5,000 to Zanardelli, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
666(a)(2).  Anthony Lam received a sentence of three years‘ 
probation from District Court Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr.  
Likewise, Friedman draws attention to the 24-month sentence 
that the District Court imposed on Zanardelli for accepting 
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bribes as a public official.  The District Court was intimately 
familiar with all of the facts as they relate to Zanardelli.  
Responding to Friedman‘s motion with respect to § 
3553(a)(6) was clearly within the District Court‘s knowledge 
of the case.   
 The District Court‘s only discussion of this alleged 
disparity in sentencing was that the District Court noted that it 
was required to ―consider a fairness with regard to other 
offenders who are sentenced by the Court.‖  (App. at 961.)  
The District Court did not state whether there was a 
sentencing disparity or address whether comparing 
Friedman‘s sentence to Lam‘s sentence or Zanardelli‘s 
sentence demonstrated a sentencing disparity.  The District 
Court must address whether there is a sentencing disparity 
because there is no explicit discussion or indication in the 
record that it was considered.  See Negroni, 638 F.3d at 446 
(3d Cir. 2011) (―While the District Court identified the 
concern and stated it had considered that factor, it provided 
no explanation for why the sentence it imposed was justified 
despite the clear disparity it seemed to create.‖); Merced, 603 
F.3d at 225 (requiring remand where Merced‘s sentence was 
128 months less than what a similarly situated defendant 
could expect to receive under the circumstances and there was 
no explicit discussion or indication in the record that the 
district court considered this disparity); cf. United States v. 
Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 196 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding no 
procedural error in the district court‘s discussion of the 
sentence disparity because the District Court explained the 




 For the reasons discussed above, we will remand to the 




IV.  CONCLUSION 
 We will affirm the judgment of conviction, vacate the 
sentence, and remand for resentencing, in accordance with 
this opinion.   
                                              
4
 In light of our decision to remand for procedural error, we 
need not consider Friedman‘s arguments that the sentence 
was substantively unreasonable.  See Merced, 603 F.3d at 214 
(―If the district court commits procedural error, our preferred 
course is to remand the case for re-sentencing, without going 
any further.‖ (citation omitted)). 
